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State v. Horning

Published, 7/28/1995
. . . " of impairment evidence is unreliable. It is true that we have previously noted the limited value of visible evidence of intoxication. In State v. Graham, we said, \"although he can walk straight, although he may attend to his business, and may not give any outward and visible signs to the casual observer that he is drunk,\" a person may still be under the influence. 176 Minn. 164 , 168, 222 N.W. 909 , 911" . . .
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Anderson v. STATE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Published, 5/22/1981
. . . " of similar phraseology and purpose have generally interpreted the phrase to cover driving by a person who has drunk enough liquor so that his capacity to drive is impaired in some way. Annot., 142 A.L.R. 555 (1943), and supplements thereto. This is also the interpretation which many judges in Minnesota have relied upon in their instructions. See, for example, H. Wolner, Judicial Manual on Misdemeanors V" . . .
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State v. VanWert

Published, 7/21/1989
. . . " to obtain a conviction. See Minn.Stat. § 609.21 (1982). Under that statute we made it clear that although drunk driving often was involved, it was error to equate drunk driving with gross negligence. See, e.g., State v. McGee, 347 N.W.2d 802 , 806 (Minn.1984), and State v. Hansen, 296 Minn. 42 , 46 47, 206 N.W.2d 352 , 355 (1973). In 1983 and 1984 the legislature amended the statute in a number of ways" . . .
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State v. Shepard

Published, 3/13/1992
. . . " she did not call the sheriff's office until an hour and a half after she got home and claimed she had drunk five shots of whiskey after arriving home and before returning to the scene with her father in law. The jury acquitted defendant of driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .10 or more but found her guilty of driving under the influence and of careless driving. We are concerned only" . . .
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State v. Losh

Published, 9/18/2008
. . . " a safety threat to others when driving on Minnesota roads. This overall strategy distinguishes the regulations at issue from general traffic and driving regulations, in that their violation creates a greater risk of direct injury to persons and property. The policy of protecting the public from drunk drivers is implicated when a person who has had his or her driving privileges revoked for driving while" . . .
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State v. Busse

Published, 5/16/2002
. . . " to enact criminal laws involving repeat drunk driving offenses unrelated to licensure. Indeed, as the majority notes, there is now a felony level drunk driving offense reaching just this type of conduct. See Minn.Stat. § 169A.24 (Supp.2001) (prohibiting as a felony driving while impaired within ten years of the first of three or more qualified prior impaired driving incidents). The logical progression" . . .
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Hedglin v. City of Willmar

Published, 8/13/1998
. . . " they had been drinking and that firefighters were driving fire trucks to fire calls while they were drunk. Grove asserts that his reports resulted in the following harassment: Lindblad told the firefighters at a department meeting not to talk to the members of the pro Lundquist faction, firefighters drove by Grove's house honking their horns, Grove was given the silent treatment, and one of the pro" . . .
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State v. Raines

Published, 8/12/1933
. . . " stopped. I seen I was going to get drunk or sick, that is why I stopped, to keep from driving.' \"Q. `Were you drunk when they arrested you?' A. `I was awfully sick, I don't know whether I was drunk.'\" According to defendant's own statements he had been drinking and indirectly admitted that he might have been rather drunk. The jury evidently did not believe that appellant, within a few minutes, could" . . .
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State v. Parker

Published, 1/22/1988
. . . " denied that he had drunk anything that day. When asked what he drank, he said vodka. When asked where, he said at home. When asked when he started and when he stopped, he said he did not drink that day and stopped the day before. He denied that he was under the influence. An inventory search of his car, which was towed, resulted in the discovery in the back seat of a bottle of vodka. The bottle holds" . . .
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State v. Revard

Published, 6/21/1937
. . . " having occurred at the outskirts of Bolivar, the county seat). A dozen or so of these people testified that defendant appeared to be intoxicated and in their judgment was. Some of them described his actions, speech, etc. The sheriff, who had known defendant for a number of years and had transacted \"quite a bit\" of business with him, testified that on the occasion in question defendant \"was drunk" . . .
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Olson v. Ische

Published, 1/20/1984
. . . ", Willard L. Converse, St. Paul, for Randy Lee Fritz, respondent. Rothstein, Wolf, Kaplan & Goff, Howard L. Kaplan, St. Paul, for All Nation Ins. Co., respondent. Kronick, Moskovitz, Tiedemann & Girard, Beth Ann Lane, Sacramento, Cal., for amicus curiae Mothers Against Drunk Drivers (in support of plaintiff appellants). Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc. SIMONETT, Justice" . . .
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State v. Reiland

Published, 5/6/1966
. . . " views 4 or are readily distinguishable, 5 save one, 6 the reasoning of which we do not find persuasive. Two California cases are noteworthy. One holds that vehicular manslaughter and leaving the scene of the accident are not within the prohibitions of that state's double punishment statute, 7 and the other holds that convictions for vehicular manslaughter and felony drunk driving are. 8 Both" . . .
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State v. McGee

Published, 4/27/1984
. . . ", which is a one way street, and was running a red light. After hitting the victim, defendant kept driving. Two witnesses followed defendant for a few blocks, and he stopped momentarily. One of the witnesses got out and approached him and told him not to flee. Defendant, who appeared to the witness to be drunk, ignored her remarks and drove off. The victim died at the scene. Police found defendant's van" . . .
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State of Minnesota v. Derek Lawrence Stavish

Published, 8/19/2015
. . . " of the search. See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404. A. The United States Supreme Court has considered whether exigent circumstances existed to justify a warrantless blood draw of a suspected drunk driver in two relevant cases. McNeely, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552 ; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In Schmerber, the defendant was arrested at a hospital on suspicion of driving under the influence" . . .
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Opinion No. (1983)

Published, 9/6/1983
. . . " for a conviction of driving while intoxicated when the person convicted has a prior county or municipal ordinance conviction for a similar offense. As always in these opinions, we seek to analyze the law and decide the issues presented as would a court faced with a similar legal question. Yet this opinion deserves — and has received — special attention. Drunk driving is a plague on our society. Our" . . .
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State v. Hanson

Published, 1/19/1996
. . . "). On appeal to this court, appellants argue that civil driver's license revocation is \"punishment\" under the Double Jeopardy Clause, and therefore bars any subsequent criminal charges for the same conduct. The state counters that license revocation is remedial, not \"punishment,\" and is rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of removing *86 drunk drivers from Minnesota's streets" . . .
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State v. Stark

Published, 2/22/1985
. . . " not focused on what is meant by the phrase \"under the influence of alcohol.\" However, courts in other states having statutes of similar phraseology and purpose have generally interpreted the phrase to cover driving by a person who has drunk enough liquor so that his capacity to drive is impaired in some way. Annot., 142 A.L.R. 555 (1943), and supplements thereto. This is also the interpretation which many" . . .
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State v. Duren

Published, 8/23/1963
. . . " they asked you to sign this form? \"A. He said that it appeared that he was intoxicated and he thought that I should sign the form, and the man he was with also told me that he was drunk and I should sign the form. \"Q. You didn't see him actually, did you? \"A. No, I didn't. \"Q. You didn't know if he was or wasn't, is that correct? \"A. Right. \"Q. Is this then correct, that based on what the police officers" . . .
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Ruby v. Clark

Published, 1/12/1948
. . . " as follows: (1) That he drove said motor vehicle at a high and dangerous rate of speed under the circumstances; (2) that he failed to keep a lookout for other persons using said highway; (3) that he failed to keep his motor vehicle under control so as to be able to stop the same upon the reasonable appearance of danger; (4) that he drove said motor vehicle while drunk and while under the influence" . . .
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State v. Stone

Published, 12/11/1997
. . . " is \"likely to endanger any property or person\"); State v. Horning, 535 N.W.2d 296 , 300 (Minn.1995) (Minn. Stat. § 169.121 intended to create as effective and encompassing a remedy as possible to eradicate drunk driving from our streets and highways). Having determined that the broad conduct of driving is the proper focus of the Cabazon test, we apply the test to hold that driving is generally permitted" . . .
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Olson v. Com'r of Public Safety

Published, 8/2/1985
. . . " was in the area, and in close proximity to the subject car.\" Marben, 294 N.W.2d at 699. In this case, we assume the deputies' reliance on the dispatcher's message, viewed objectively, was justified. The dispatcher's message was much like the wanted flyer in Hensley. The deputies, having been told a particularly described automobile might have a drunk driver, then driving on the road, were justified in checking" . . .
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State, Department of Public Safety v. Nystrom

Published, 4/12/1974
. . . ", the lower court found that defendant refused the test, stating as his reasons that he had drunk a beer shortly before he was arrested and that he did not understand what the officer meant when he advised him that refusal to permit testing would result in license revocation. However, the record is clear that the officer made a special effort to explain the statute to defendant at least twice, and under" . . .
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State v. Reifsteck

Published, 6/3/1927
. . . ", their testimony as to his happy and loquacious condition materially aiding in providing him with free lodging and board for a term of three years. The car was afterwards driven from the ditch by a boy scout, and defendant operated it in a serpentine trail along the road. A half dozen or more witnesses testified that he was drunk, among whom was a physician. The defendant admitted to the travelers that he" . . .
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Opinion No. (1984)

Published, 8/15/1984
. . . " in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1968). 2 For this reason, the opinions herein expressed are limited to those situations in which an individual has been arrested for a state or municipal drunk driving violation in which the officer has probable cause to believe the individual has committed such a violation and, pursuant to Section 577.041 , the officer requests" . . .
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State v. Henning

Published, 7/31/2003
. . . " recognized on multiple occasions the seriousness of this problem. See, e.g., Ascher, 519 N.W.2d at 185 (citing the magnitude of the problem with drunk driving and the strong state interest in eradicating it); Heddan v. Dirkswager, 336 N.W.2d 54 , 62 63 (Minn.1983) (discussing the relationship of drunk driving to tragedy on the highways). Despite the best efforts of legislators and law enforcement, impaired" . . .
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State v. Paul

Published, 5/23/1996
. . . " alcohol level might have dissipated while a warrant was being obtained, or Paul might have drunk more alcohol, making a chemical test unreliable. See Storvick, 428 N.W.2d at 58 (defendant informed arresting officers that \"I drank after I got home\" in an attempt to thwart the state's attempt to collect evidence against him). Based on our holding in Storvick, we conclude that exigent circumstances were" . . .
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State, Dept. of Public Safety v. Rice

Published, 8/20/1982
. . . " an inebriated man in a pickup truck on the highway and then moved the truck off the road onto a shoulder. The officers drove to the scene and found a pickup truck parked on the shoulder with the motor running and the defendant, who was drunk, lying in the cab. The officers arrested the defendant and he was charged, prosecuted and convicted for \"operating\" the truck while under the influence rather than" . . .
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State v. Harris

Published, 11/24/1972
. . . " on the floor. His body was in no manner in contact with any of the vehicle's controls. When aroused, the defendant appeared drunk and was arrested and convicted for \"operating\" a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The patrolman had no warrant for arrest and therefore could not legally make an arrest unless the offense was committed or attempted in his presence. Minn.St. 629.34; State v. Miller, 290 Minn. 33" . . .
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State v. Starfield

Published, 3/13/1992
. . . ", for respondent. James C. Wicker, Minneapolis, for amicus curiae, Mothers Against Drunk Driving. Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc. SIMONETT, Justice. There may be circumstances where operability of a vehicle is relevant on the issue of whether a person has physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. In this case failure to give a supplementary instruction" . . .
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City of Minnetonka v. Shepherd

Published, 3/25/1988
. . . " westbound 55. They saw no improper driving before they stopped the car. The driver was drunk. In a 5 3 decision, we distinguished the case from Marben on the ground that nothing was known about the informant or about what led him to believe that the driver was \"possibly\" drunk. As we put it, for all that the officers knew, they were being asked to stop a car on \"the whim of an anonymous caller.\" 371 N.W" . . .
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State v. Bonga

Published, 9/29/1967
. . . " much he drank there, but considered himself \"real drunk.\" He did not remember leaving the bar. A pharmacist testified that at about 9:30 p. m., defendant entered the drug store where the witness was employed. Defendant had his right hand under his shirt. He walked across the front of the store and started down a side aisle, when the witness came up behind him and asked if he could help him. Defendant" . . .
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State v. Willis

Published, 4/8/1983
. . . " that there are no tests, and in the next breath requires that the jury be instructed not to draw any inference from that fact. The statute does not, as defendants suggest, provide for the meaningless introduction of evidence of the absence of tests. The statute serves a curative purpose. The practice of administering chemical tests to persons suspected of drunk driving, particularly chemical analysis of the breath" . . .
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State v. Davis

Published, 9/19/1986
. . . " number EMN 880. The officer located the car, going eastbound on Highway 55, and followed it into a bar parking lot, then westbound onto Highway 55. He observed no erratic driving before stopping the car. We distinguished the case from Marben on the ground that nothing was known about the informant or about what led him to believe that the driver was \"possibly\" drunk. In other words, for all" . . .
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Nyflot v. Commissioner of Public Safety

Published, 6/11/1985
. . . " prior to deciding whether to submit to testing. Since the driver's revocation action is civil in nature and since the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Sections 6 and 7 of the Minnesota Constitution have to do only with criminal proceedings, I would reverse the court of appeals. YETKA, Justice (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I fully recognize that drunk driving" . . .
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State v. Anderson

Published, 12/5/1986
. . . " artery, but had simply been scared. Defendant testified that after McArthur died, he sat in the room drinking until daylight. At some point, he rinsed off the glasses and the knife. By the time he left he was very drunk. He grabbed a bottle of rum, scooped everything that was on the table, including rings, wallet, and keys, into a duffel bag and left. Defendant denied removing a ring from the victim's" . . .
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State v. VanWagner

Published, 8/20/1993
. . . " of driving, operating, or being in physical control of the motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The evidence to establish that defendant was the driver was overwhelming. Defendant was found drunk, slumped behind the steering wheel, in a car that was illegally stopped on the traveled portion of the highway. Defendant was the owner of the car and the car keys were under" . . .
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State of Minnesota v. William Robert Bernard, Jr.

Published, 2/11/2015
. . . " (Footnote continued from previous page.) search and seizure within the limitations of the Fourth Amendment.”). In this case, however, the officers did not ask Bernard to submit to a blood test. Therefore, the question of a blood or urine test incident to arrest is not before us, and we express no opinion as to whether a blood or urine test of a suspected drunk driver could be justified as a search" . . .
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State v. Hansen

Published, 4/6/1973
. . . " drunk.\" The fourth passenger was unable to express an opinion. One arresting officer stated he could smell the odor of alcohol but could not tell whether the defendant was drunk. One of the officers present at the collision scene said defendant walked \"pretty straight.\" In this appeal defendant challenges his criminal negligence conviction. Criminal negligence under Minn.St. 609.21 is the operation" . . .
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Marlowe v. Gunderson

Published, 4/28/1961
. . . " of the defendant, to characterize him in his final argument as a `drunk'; \"c) In final argument, to ask the jury to put themselves in the place of a plaintiff for the purpose of assessing damages. \"Whether verdicts of $15,000 and $6,900 are excessive, where proof of pain and suffering following a whiplash injury depends almost entirely upon subjective symptoms, there is almost an entire absence of objective" . . .
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Markel v. City of Circle Pines

Published, 1/17/1992
. . . " license might be treated differently, Markel's conduct in driving drunk, thus putting at risk his ability to drive his employer's vehicles due to loss of his driver's license, is misconduct under Tilseth, because it showed an intentional and substantial disregard of his duties and obligations to his employer. This is particularly true where Markel had previously lost his ability to drive because" . . .
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State v. Larivee

Published, 1/30/2003
. . . " impaired to \"require the driver to provide a sample of the driver's breath for a preliminary screening test.\" Minn.Stat. § 169A.41, subd. 1 (2002). 1 If the driver refuses the preliminary screening test, his or her refusal is admissible evidence in a criminal prosecution for drunk driving. Minn.Stat. § 169A.45, subd. 3 (2002). 2 In addition, if a driver refuses either a blood, breath, or urine test" . . .
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City of Fairmont v. Sjostrom

Published, 4/5/1968
. . . " true. \"Q. As a matter of fact, you do not know of your own knowledge whether he ever drove a motor vehicle on the streets of Fairmont drunk or sober? \"A. No, I don't. \"Q. And the events that you have related took place outside of the city limits as previously described by Officer Pugsley? \"A. Yes.\" Officer Clayton J. Pugsley, when called as a witness, testified as follows: \"Q. Now, Mr. Pugsley, did" . . .
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Friedman v. Com'r of Public Safety

Published, 8/15/1991
. . . " is severely punished and the state relatively unharmed. Even without the chemical test, the driver can still be convicted of driving while intoxicated. * * * * * * The person suspected of drunk driving is generally an average citizen in a totally new, confusing, and uncomfortable situation. One's dignity, the dignity of a free citizen to determine one's rights and obligations through consultation" . . .
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State, City of Eagan v. Elmourabit

Published, 8/23/1985
. . . " for a person under the influence of liquor, where judgment or reflexes have been impaired, to nevertheless be able to perform the tests satisfactorily. Long ago, in State v. Graham, 176 Minn. 164 , 168, 222 N.W. 909 , 911 (1929), we acknowledged, \"Although he can walk straight, although he may attend to his business and may not give any outward and visible signs to the casual observer that he is drunk" . . .
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Manthey v. Charles E. Bernick, Inc.

Published, 2/20/1981
. . . " standards was a drunk driver. Before he died he admitted to consuming \"too much beer.\" Nevertheless the court of appeals found his intoxication was not the proximate cause of the accident which killed him. Under our statute, Minn.Stat. § 169.121, (1)(d) (1980), a person is presumed to be intoxicated if there is a .10 alcohol concentration in his blood while operating a motor vehicle. In the instant case" . . .
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State v. Bryant

Published, 11/10/1947
. . . "; and it was necessary for two officers to hold him up while he was booked. He was not given the intoxication test because he was \"too drunk.\" Three other police officers, besides the arresting officer, were very positive as to defendant's thoroughly inebriated condition upon arrival at police headquarters. Defendant denied he was intoxicated at any time while operating his car. The novel aspect of his defense" . . .
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Seeley v. Sobczak

Published, 6/15/1979
. . . " was taken to St. Luke's Hospital in Duluth, where an autopsy was performed. His blood alcohol concentration was determined to be .269 grams percent. At trial, one of Seeley's drinking companions of January 23 testified that Seeley was drunk that evening. Another companion, who was only at the tavern with Seeley about 45 minutes on January 23, testified that when that particular group got together" . . .
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State v. Speak

Published, 11/4/1983
. . . " walked normally. Campbell testified that he did not know if defendant was under the influence, that all he could say was the defendant had been drinking and that he was not sloppy drunk by any means. Officer Gillet, who was in defendant's presence on the way to the station, testified similarly. The officers, who had told defendant that he would have to take a test, read defendant the provisions" . . .
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State v. Marsyla

Published, 5/26/1978
. . . " of peppermint schnapps, and three six packs of beer. Defendant's father, Eino Marsyla, stopped in at about 3 p. m. and found them \"drunk or drinking.\" He was disturbed because defendant's brother was in the hospital in critical condition and gave defendant and Viola a lecture about their drinking at such a critical time. Gail came home from the community college at about 5 p. m. Bruce, who had come home" . . .
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State v. Galbraith

Published, 6/10/1932
. . . " at the time and was thick tongued in his speech. The sheriff helped appellant over to his own car and towed in appellant's car. Appellant the next morning, after a night in jail, was suffering from the after effects of intoxication, but he was no longer drunk. A special deputy sheriff who was present was asked whether appellant was directing the movement of the car which was being driven by Archie Rowe" . . .
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State v. Kinn

Published, 7/10/1970
. . . " that defendant was talking incoherently and appeared to be drunk, they arrested him and placed him in the squad car, at which time he was given what the officers stated was a Miranda warning. One of the officers testified: \"I told him he had the right to remain silent, that anything he might say would be used against him, that he had the right to legal counsel in a lawyer, and also explained to him that he" . . .
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State v. Thomas

Published, 12/31/1927
. . . ", he assigned the specific reason \"especially as to the making of the statement `that the defendant was drunk on that occasion.'\" This assignment is based upon a statement in argument by the State's counsel when he said that appellant had ravished prosecutrix after he had given her intoxicating liquor and appellant himself had taken it. No objection was made at the time. After counsel had concluded" . . .
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State v. Berkelman

Published, 9/21/1984
. . . " conviction of driving while under the influence of intoxicating beverages. All the state has to prove is that, in fact, the accused had a prior drunk driving conviction within the statutory time limits. The details and facts surrounding that prior conviction are normally irrelevant to a section 169.121, subd. 3 prosecution. Therefore, I would affirm the trial court's ruling in prohibiting the use" . . .
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State v. Brehmer

Published, 8/2/1968
. . . " of the passengers to object to his driving discloses that he was not intoxicated. Such a failure is, of course, evidence, but it is not conclusive. Admittedly, defendant had drunk heavily. Two witnesses testified that he drove a bit unsteadily from Dodge to the Midway and from the Midway to Winona. Huebner said defendant was \"high\" when he reached Winona. This evidence suffices to support a finding that defendant" . . .
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State Department of Highways v. Normandin

Published, 6/20/1969
. . . ", Cal.App., 71 Cal.Rptr. 123. In that case, the driver refused to submit to a chemical test after his arrest for driving while under the influence. At the administrator's hearing, he contended that he was so drunk he did not have the mental ability to know what he was doing, if it was a fact that he had refused to submit to a test, and that he should not be denied his license because of such a refusal" . . .
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State Ex Rel. Crossley v. Tahash

Published, 7/27/1962
. . . " then in the company of Frand LeRoy Penney, were you not? A. Well, to be perfectly honest, I was drunk so much and everything is so vague I don't recollect exactly what I was doing. I don't remember anything vividly. \"Q. Well, it was that night when you attempted to rob the filling station. You say things are so vague you don't remember? A. I have a vague recollection of it. \"Q. You were in company with someone" . . .
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Costillo v. Commissioner of Public Safety

Published, 12/18/1987
. . . " outside and handcuffed him. Fennern asked if Costillo had drunk anything after the accident, and Mrs. Costillo said no. Shortly thereafter Fennern and Ries drove Costillo to Ranheim's house, and Ranheim positively identified Costillo as the driver who fled the scene. At the police station Costillo failed coordination tests, failed a preliminary breath test, and failed a regular breath test (his reading" . . .
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City of Bloomington v. Kossow

Published, 11/13/1964
. . . " offenses. Public safety in respect to the use of the streets is obviously the chief purpose of the ordinance of 1938. The first mentioned ordinance, in about the same language, has been in force since the city was organized and is to promote and preserve common decency. We think a violation of one is a distinct offense from that of a violation of the *208 other. Had defendant been arrested drunk, seated" . . .
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Stotzheim v. Djos

Published, 7/31/1959
. . . " with the accident at 12 o'clock, 2 hours of this time being spent en route. The defendant testified that at the time of the accident he considered himself to be under the influence of the beer he had drunk and that he was tired, a condition he attributed to the beer and a weakened physical condition resulting from lack of food in the diet he was following. 1. It is well established both under Minnesota" . . .
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State v. Padgett

Published, 12/20/1926
. . . ", in which the defendant and another were riding, on account of the reckless manner in which they were driving; in so doing the marshal jumped upon the running board and turning off the switch stopped the car. While thus engaged he discovered that the defendant and his companion were drunk and he took them into custody. As he pulled the defendant out of the car a bottle of whiskey fell out of his pocket" . . .
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State v. Connor

Published, 12/12/1927
. . . " arrested appellant and Vanderpool, at which time both were intoxicated. The deputy sheriff said \"they were both so darned drunk they didn't know what they were doing.\" The next morning, when in jail, appellant told the deputy sheriff that he was driving the car, but it belonged to \"young Flanigan.\" The jug of whiskey was identified at the trial and pronounced by several witnesses as \"whiskey\" and by some" . . .
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State v. McMillen

Published, 6/5/1931
. . . " had a pint and a half, what, if any thing, did he say as to what it was? A. No, he just said it was liquor. \"Q. Now, have you — I will ask you if you have, on various occasions, drunk liquor and know the taste of liquor? A. Well, no, I am not much of a judge of it; it all tastes alike to me . \"Q. How? A. It all tastes alike to me . \"Q. Do you know the taste of corn whiskey? A. Well" . . .
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Ascher v. Commissioner of Public Safety

Published, 6/30/1994
. . . ". 2637 , 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979), and adopted in Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz , sobriety checkpoints would pass muster under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. No one can doubt the public concern over drunk drivers on our highways. The roadblock here was more effective in identifying alcohol impaired drivers than that found permissible in Sitz and the intrusion was slight" . . .
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State v. Othoudt

Published, 3/13/1992
. . . " entering the house Deputy Olmanson began questioning Dawn Othoudt about the accident and her injuries. During the questioning Dawn Othoudt admitted that she had not been the driver of the car and said that her husband had been driving. She also said that he had been drinking all day and was drunk. As she said this she pointed upstairs. Deputy Olmanson and the ambulance attendant, followed by Dawn Othoudt" . . .
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Turck v. ST. CLOUD CIVIL SERVICE BD.

Published, 6/2/1978
. . . " a private automobile, Turck struck a parked car. He was subsequently charged with driving while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, and on Monday, July 14, was relieved of duty pending investigation of the accident. He then talked to Captain Robert Wittschen who, appellant said, advised him to admit he was drunk and recommended counseling. Wittschen said he told appellant he knew" . . .
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Dornfeld v. Oberg

Published, 7/23/1993
. . . " crash caused by a drunk or reckless driver could maintain an action against the driver for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 4 Instead, the Restatement contemplates that recovery should be permitted only when the extreme and outrageous conduct is directed at a third person, such as when a husband is murdered in the presence of his wife. In such cases, \"the actor may know" . . .
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Wadena v. Bush

Published, 8/15/1975
. . . " the motions of respondents to delete from the records certain references to the alleged intoxication of respondents. Specifically, the trial court deleted an entry in a space on the hospital records for David Deegan—apparently provided for the use of \"police\"—which contained the word \"drunk\" and an entry in a space provided for \"type of accident\" which contained the words, \"Disorderly conduct car vs. car" . . .
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State v. Harlow

Published, 3/25/1931
. . . " arrested after the car was searched. As the sheriff and Oberwether approached the car, Bradley was \"assisting\" Ferrell and Mrs. Harlow out of the car, and all three of the officers observed that Mrs. Harlow was intoxicated. \"very drunk.\" After Ferrell and Mrs. Harlow got out of the car, Bradley took a bunch of keys out of the \"dash board,\" and used one of the keys to unlock a compartment in the rear part" . . .
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State v. Storvick

Published, 8/5/1988
. . . " be taking him to the hospital for a blood test whether or not he consented. Defendant responded to this information by saying, \"I drank after I got home.\" A decision was then made to check the house to see if there was any evidence that defendant had drunk liquor after he got home. The officers checked and found no such evidence. Defendant was taken to the hospital and a blood sample was taken from him" . . .
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Reed v. Koch

Published, 3/2/1926
. . . " in the Allen case, but does contend that plaintiff was guilty of such contributory negligence as to bar him from recovery as a matter of law. This contention is based on plaintiff's testimony on cross examination, which was as follows: \"I saw Wilkerson go up there the morning I was hurt, up there three or four times I guess, before 9:30. \"Q. By the time 9:30 arrived he was what you would call drunk? A. Yes" . . .
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State v. Larsen

Published, 8/29/2002
. . . "—is surely no greater than that at stake in Ascher —protection of human lives through deterrence of drunk driving. Our ruling in Ascher then, that even the state's interest in apprehending drunk drivers does not outweigh the right of privacy in an automobile, is compelling in reaching our conclusion that respondent had a reasonable expectation of privacy that was violated when Officer Fritz entered his" . . .
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Millhouser v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co.

Published, 12/20/1932
. . . " was intoxicated or not. Whether the driver of the car, or even plaintiff himself, was drunk or sober, the defendant owed him the same duty not to injure him when it had the last clear chance not to do so. Negligence of plaintiff in going into or being in a position of peril creates no exception to the humanitarian rule. The very essence of that rule is to exclude the negligence of the one invoking it. When" . . .
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Blaisdell v. Commissioner of Public Safety

Published, 2/21/1986
. . . " and articulable facts to conduct an investigatory stop. In Olson v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 371 N.W.2d 552 (Minn.1985), we held that an anonymous tip by a citizen who had observed a possible drunk driver did not justify stopping the car. We stated, however, that the police dispatcher in Olson did not have specific and articulable facts on which to issue the information to the police because" . . .
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Hardy v. Anderson

Published, 3/26/1954
. . . " of the facts and that their recollection of the *484 facts must prevail over any contrary contentions of counsel and further that they must take and apply the law as given by the court and not as presented by counsel. Defendant in his argument to the jury said that undoubtedly, opposing counsel would argue that plaintiff was not drunk because the police officers didn't haul him away. In the light" . . .
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Strand v. Village of Watson

Published, 10/28/1955
. . . " as being drunk, that I wouldn't say he was. \"Q. You wouldn't say that he was? \"A. No. \"Q. Would you say that he wasn't? \"A. I could tell he had been drinking, but I don't know how much or anything.\" On cross examination Peterson testified as follows: \"Q. Now, let's see, Mr. Martinson had been in there sometime before you got there, and you say you could tell he had had a few drinks? \"A. Yes, you know" . . .
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Williams v. Williams

Published, 11/10/1947
. . . " paid for the home in Oxford, Mississippi, which she took in the name of both herself and petitioner. She described the altercation at Oxford in June, 1947. She said petitioner was drunk and asked for more liquor; that she threw her second drink into the sink. She said he made embarrassing demands of her in the presence of the children, and that she scratched him, whereupon petitioner struck her" . . .
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Cady v. Coleman

Published, 2/12/1982
. . . " Company bought drinks for Coleman. Coleman stated that he did not buy any drinks for himself that evening. By 10:30 p. m., Coleman began to appear intoxicated; nevertheless, *595 Chapman bought at least one more drink for him. Coleman had drunk approximately eight \"Rusty Nails\" by 11:35 p. m. About midnight, Chapman decided to get some coffee for Coleman. As he was talking to a waitress, Chapman saw" . . .
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State v. Shriner

Published, 5/30/2008
. . . " in the bloodstream alone constitutes a sufficient exigency for a warrantless blood draw to obtain evidence of intoxication following a lawful arrest for a drunk driving related violation or crime * * *; or (b) that the rapid dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream, coupled with an accident, hospitalization, and the lapse of two hours until arrest, constitute exigent circumstances for such a blood draw. Id" . . .
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State v. West

Published, 11/21/1969
. . . " behind him, he turned over to the right side of the highway rather than stop on the wrong side. Defendant insisted that he had no recollection of a burglary. Two friends of defendant testified in his behalf, stating that they were with him at the party on the night of January 15, 1967; that he \"was drunk\" but refused their offers of a ride home; that the party lasted until about 2 or 3 a. m" . . .
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Cole v. City of Spring Lake Park

Published, 1/22/1982
. . . " this suit is based. The Ramsey County District Court, assuming as true that Kozlowski was served free beer from the Schroeder's keg when he was obviously drunk and one or both Schroeders knew he was drunk, dismissed the complaint against the Schroeders. The court concluded that Kozlowski and Thomas Schroeder were not engaged in a joint enterprise and that the legislature had preempted the field" . . .
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Smithers v. Barker

Published, 12/14/1937
. . . " you should find and believe from the evidence, that plaintiff did not exercise due care for his own safety, and was, or was not, then and there drunk and negligent, in getting himself into the aforesaid position of imminent peril, if any, at said time and place.\" We consider it to be proper in a humanitarian negligence case to inform the jury that contributory negligence of plaintiff" . . .
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St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Love

Published, 8/31/1990
. . . " for the professional liability carrier to insure the therapist against the risk he may not abstain from a sexual relationship with a patient, than it is for the auto liability carrier to insure a driver against the risk he may not abstain from exceeding the speed limit or driving while drunk. Other jurisdictions have also found insurance coverage in similar cases. L.L. v. Medical Protective Co., 122 Wis. 2d 455" . . .
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State v. Condit

Published, 3/19/1925
. . . " of defendant, also was a witness in her behalf. Bert Whittaker had been a friend of Roy Condit. The evidence shows they had been quite intimate for years, and that Whittaker often visited Condit at home. Roy Condit drank a great deal, was frequently drunk, and at such times was cruel to his wife. *Page 399 On March 27th, the day following the disappearance of her husband, Emma Condit hired Whittaker to drive" . . .
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Lincoln Lamar Caldwell v. State of Minnesota

Published, 9/24/2014
. . . " is required. At trial, Carnell testified that Caldwell owned the gun that killed Brian Cole and that Caldwell “gave the gun to the shooter.” In describing how Caldwell passed the D 2 gun to the shooter, Carnell said, “I think over the seat.” During cross examination, Carnell admitted that he was drunk at the time of the incident, and admitted he told a police investigator “he was like really drunk" . . .
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State v. Wahlberg

Published, 8/8/1980
. . . ". He testified that they were drunk and told him they were looking for a party. He told them there was no party at the apartment and went back to bed. He *413 heard the group open the refrigerator in the kitchen, looking for beer, and then leave five or ten minutes later. Terry Gfeller testified that he was living at the Wolf Lake Resort 10 miles west of Ely on March 9 and that when he went out" . . .
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State v. Klawitter

Published, 6/30/1994
. . . ", which did not reveal the presence of alcohol. Defendant also agreed to provide a urine sample but apparently was unable to do so. After \"ruling out alcohol as the cause of the impairment,\" Daly gave Klawitter a Miranda warning and interrogated him. Klawitter told Daly he had drunk two cups of gin and \"was taking * * * marijuana.\" Daly performed the eye tests and \"observed" . . .
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State v. Zeimet

Published, 5/26/2005
696 N.W.2d 791 (2005) STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Robert S. ZEIMET, Appellant. No. A03 273. Supreme Court of Minnesota. May 26, 2005. *792 John Stuart, State Public Defender, James R. Peterson, Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellant. Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Mark Nathan Lystig, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, MN, for Respondent. Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc. OPINION ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., Justice. Th . . .
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Wallace v. St. Joseph Ry., L., H. P. Co.

Published, 1/7/1935
. . . ", viz., — failure of the bus driver to \"check\" the speed of the bus. Over plaintiff's objections defendant's counsel was permitted to state to the jury in his opening statement that he expected to prove that deceased and his two companions had been drinking intoxicating liquor the afternoon of the accident and were drunk when the accident occurred and to introduce evidence tending so to show" . . .
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Opinion No. (1988)

Published, 7/27/1988
Dear Mr. Stevenson: This opinion is in response to your question asking: Upon the arrest of a sixteen year old for Driving While Intoxicated, First Offense, Section 577.010 , R.S.Mo., or Driving While Intoxicated in violation of municipal ordinance, may a law enforcement officer, pursuant to the usual and customary booking procedures of his or her agency, fingerprint and photograph the sixteen year old? 1 Section 211.031 .1, RSMo 1986, provides in part: Juvenile court to have exclusive jurisdict . . .
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State v. Jarvis

Published, 7/24/2003
. . . " and told him that she had been drugged and raped and could not drive, and stopped at a weigh station to wait for him. Officer Eric Flood arrived at the weigh station at 5:30 p.m. and observed K.F. as being very confused, with slurred speech. Flood testified that K.F. appeared to be drunk and could hardly stand or move on her own. K.F. was admitted to St. Mary's Hospital at 6:55 p.m. where she" . . .
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Broberg v. State

Published, 5/1/1970
. . . " persons all were physically dissimilar from him, with not one of them coming within 6 inches of his height or close to his weight. However, there was contradicting testimony at the trial to the effect that there was another participant in the lineup who was approximately the same height as petitioner. Prior to the lineup petitioner had been serving a sentence in the workhouse for drunk driving" . . .
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State v. Lyle

Published, 10/9/1944
. . . " and took it and laid it on the bed beside of her. Witness stated that appellant at the time said that it hurt him to look at a dead person, but it didn't hurt him at all to look at her there, that he would have killed her about two years ago if she had not run and got away from him — down a hill. Witness testified that appellant said, `Maybe you fellows think I am drunk or crazy, but I know as well" . . .
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State v. Lopez

Published, 12/10/1998
. . . " of the drinking, there was no testimony or other evidence presented as to the quantity he may have drunk or of his being in an intoxicated state. And there was no testimony or other evidence even suggesting that Lopez was using marijuana. Before the trial court instructed the jury, Lopez's defense counsel, arguing that Lopez was too intoxicated to form the requisite intent required for a first degree murder" . . .
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Urban v. American Legion Dept. of Minnesota

Published, 10/19/2006
. . . ", Justice. The tragedy that gives rise to this litigation occurred on August 10, 2000, when a drunk driver struck the Urban family car, leaving wife and mother Barbara Urban dead and children Marcus and Brett Urban with serious and lifelong injuries. The Urbans sued American Legion Post 184 under the Civil Damages Act, Minn.Stat. §§ 340A.801 .802 (2004) (\"CDA\"), alleging that Post 184 illegally served" . . .
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Brown v. Weber Implement Auto Co.

Published, 11/10/1947
. . . ", with Folle driving at a speed of twenty five to thirty miles an hour, according to the dependents' evidence, the right rear wheel came off and the car collided with a telephone pole. The testimony was that neither Brown nor Folle were drunk and Brown requested Folle to drive because he was tired and wanted to relax. *Page 7 Members of the boat and yacht clubs testified that they had discontinued" . . .
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State Ex Rel. Snider v. Shain

Published, 3/5/1940
. . . " though you should find and believe from the evidence, that plaintiff did not exercise due care for his own safety, and was, or was not, then and there drunk and negligent, in getting himself into the aforesaid position of . . . peril, if any, at said time and place.\" We held that this broad language would be in conflict with a proper sole cause instruction, for the self evident reason that it would" . . .
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Lee v. Smith

Published, 8/15/1958
. . . " during the day. One bottle of strong beer had been drunk during the morning, a bottle of 3.2 beer in the early afternoon, and a second bottle of strong beer at about 6:30 p.m. on the evening of the accident. The plaintiff testified that the beer did not affect him. One of the highway patrolmen and the doctor who attended the plaintiff both testified that they did not detect any evidence that plaintiff" . . .
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Opinion No. 37-79 (1979)

Published, 1/17/1979
. . . " for such wines in the relevant statutes. The court held that the prohibition of the sale and transportation of intoxicating liquors does not apply to wine which is to be used solely for sacramental purposes, even though such wine if drunk in sufficient quantities will produce intoxication. The court stated: \"General terms of the statutes or the Constitution must be construed in the light of their common" . . .
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State v. Finn

Published, 12/8/1972
203 N.W.2d 114 (1972) STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Michael F. FINN, Respondent. No. 43826. Supreme Court of Minnesota. December 8, 1972. Kenneth J. Fitzpatrick, City Atty., A. Keith Hanzel and Stephen C. Rathke, Asst. City Attys., Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for appellant. Michael F. Fetsch, Public Defender, Legal Assistance of Ramsey County, St. Paul, for respondent. Considered by KNUTSON, C. J., and KELLY, MURPHY, and SCHULTZ, JJ. PER CURIAM. The state appeals from an order of . . .
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State of Minnesota v. Elizabeth Ellen Hartneck

Unpublished, 6/6/2016
. . . " police arrested her for drunk driving, and she was convicted based on the test results. Hartneck challenges the district court’s reliance on those results because, she argues, the testing officers failed to vindicate her limited right to counsel by not helping her reach a lawyer after she was asked to submit to the test. The record reveals instead that the officers’ effort to assist the extremely" . . .
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